On March 21, 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 which makes it easier for foreign private issuers to deregister and terminate the reporting obligations associated with a listing on a major U.S. exchange. We examine the characteristics of 59 firms that immediately announced they would deregister under the new rules, their potential motivations for doing so, as well as the economic consequences of their decisions. We find that these firms experienced significantly slower growth and lower stock returns than other U.S. exchange-listed foreign firms in the years preceding the decision. There is weak evidence that firms experience negative stock returns when they announce deregistration and stronger evidence that the stock-price reaction is worse for firms with higher growth. When we examine stock-price reactions around events associated with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), we find negative average stock-price reactions with some specifications but not others. Further, there is no evidence that deregistering firms were affected more negatively by SOX than foreign-listed firms that did not deregister. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that foreign firms list shares in the U.S. in order to raise capital at the lowest possible cost to finance growth opportunities and that, when those opportunities disappear, a listing becomes less valuable to corporate insiders so that firms are more likely to deregister and go home.
Introduction
A large literature examines why foreign firms choose to list their shares on a U.S. stock exchange. 1 Until recently, it was extremely difficult for foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. to terminate the obligations they imposed on themselves by cross-listing in the U.S. Though firms could delist from a U.S. exchange, they faced extremely tough obstacles in deregistering their shares. Without deregistration, a foreign firm is still subject to U.S. securities laws as governed by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. With this state of affairs, foreign firms that concluded U.S. laws and regulations had become too burdensome could not eliminate this burden easily. All of this changed with a new rule (referred to as Exchange Act Rule 12h-6) unanimously adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on March 21, 2007 . This rule makes it easier for foreign firms to deregister, so that now it is much more realistic for those cross-listed in the U.S. to consider taking the step of deregistration. As a result of this policy change, we can now learn more about the benefits and costs of cross-listings by investigating why firms choose to deregister and what the consequences of deregistration are for the shareholders of firms that do so.
Much empirical evidence affirms that, through a U.S. cross-listing, a foreign firm subjects itself to U.S. laws and institutions, and that doing so has benefits. For simplicity, we call this the "bonding theory" of cross-listings since, by subjecting themselves to U.S. laws and institutions, the controlling shareholders of foreign firms credibly bond themselves to avoid some types of actions that might decrease the wealth of minority shareholders.
2 However, recently, there has been a lot of concern that the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), as well as other regulatory developments in the U.S., have made it more costly for foreign firms to have a U.S. listing. We will call this view the "loss of competitiveness theory," since it is based on the notion that U.S. capital markets have fallen behind other markets -1 See Karolyi (2006) for a review of this literature. 2 Coffee (1999 Coffee ( , 2002 and Stulz (1999) are the first to postulate this argument that a U.S. listing enhances the protection of the firm's investors and, consequently, reduces the agency costs of controlling shareholders. See, among others, Reese and Weisbach (2002) , Doidge (2004) , Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) , Hail and Leuz (2006) , and Lel and Miller (2007) for related evidence.
especially London -in attracting foreign cross-listings. 3 Each of these views has direct implications for which foreign firms would choose to deregister from U.S. markets and for the shareholder wealth consequences of such decisions.
With the bonding theory, a cross-listing has a cost for corporate insiders, which is that they face restrictions in consuming private benefits, and a benefit, which is that they can finance growth opportunities on better terms. The benefit from cross-listing depends critically on how much corporate insiders gain from having their firm access capital markets on better terms. Insiders at a firm with no foreseeable need for external capital gain no benefit from having their firm cross-listed unless they intend to sell their stake. By terminating registration in the U.S., insiders at a firm with enough cash flow to finance its growth opportunities can extract more private benefits from their firm. Empirical evidence
shows that cross-listing firms have better growth opportunities and that their shareholders benefit when they cross-list (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Stulz, 2004, 2008; and, Hail and Leuz, 2006) . With the bonding theory, we would expect firms to terminate registration in the U.S. when doing so is feasible and when it benefits their insiders. Consequently, firms with poor growth opportunities in relation to their cash flows are more likely to deregister. Shareholders of firms that deregister are expected to be hurt by deregistration, since it increases the corporate insiders' discretion to extract private benefits at the expense of the public shareholders.
The loss of competitiveness theory has sharply different predictions from the bonding theory. With the loss of competitiveness theory, firms that deregister are firms that were adversely affected by SOX so that a U.S. listing became a burden rather than a benefit for them. Whether or not a firm deregisters therefore depends on the size of the adverse impact of SOX in relation to the benefits of listing. Although we cannot observe directly the benefit of listing, we can investigate whether the necessary condition for the loss of competitiveness theory holds, namely that foreign firms in general, and deregistering firms in particular, were adversely affected by SOX. We can also investigate whether the changes in regulations that made deregistration easier were beneficial for these firms. Presumably the market could assess whether a U.S. listing was valuable for a firm in the post-SOX environment. If a listing was no longer valuable for a firm, that firm would want to deregister and therefore would benefit from the passage of Rule 12h-6, which made deregistration easier. If there was any residual uncertainty about the benefits of deregistration for a firm, it would be resolved when that firm announced its intent to deregister. With the loss of competitiveness theory, the market should interpret such an announcement favorably.
We examine 59 firms that deregistered in the six months after Rule 12h-6 was adopted. Firms that deregister have poor growth opportunities, come predominantly from more economically developed countries, and experienced poor stock return performance over a number of years before deregistration.
Compared to other foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges, the deregistering firms also have a significantly lower "cross-listing premium." However, this lower "cross-listing premium" cannot be explained by an adverse impact of SOX.
We next examine stock-price reactions of these deregistering firms around major events surrounding the passage of SOX and find no clear evidence that the deregistering firms were affected adversely by SOX compared to other foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges. In fact, whether foreign firms with exchange listings were affected adversely by SOX at all seems to depend on the benchmark used. For some benchmarks, there is a negative wealth effect of SOX for foreign listed firms as well as for deregistering firms, but for other benchmarks there is no such effect. A reasonable assessment of the evidence is that any inference that SOX adversely affected foreign firms with exchange listings compared to those not affected by SOX is extremely fragile.
The average stock-price reactions of deregistering firms to the announcements of Rule 12h-6 are insignificantly different from zero. Such a result supports neither the loss of competitiveness theory nor the bonding theory. The average stock-price reaction to deregistering announcements is negative but insignificant, although the proportion of firms with a negative stock-price reaction is significantly greater than 50%. We also find that firms with better growth opportunities have a significantly worse deregistration stock-price reaction. These last two results are consistent with the hypothesis that a U.S.
exchange listing creates value for firms with valuable growth opportunities.
Overall, our evidence is more consistent with the bonding hypothesis than with the loss of competitiveness hypothesis. While none of the tests provide conclusive evidence that is consistent with the loss of competitiveness hypothesis, we find some results supportive of the bonding hypothesis. At the same time, however, not all results are supportive of that hypothesis. Since our results do not contradict the bonding hypothesis, there may well be an issue of the power of our tests due to the limited size of our sample. It may also be that investors partially anticipated the actions of the deregistering firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe in detail the past and new rules governing deregistration for foreign firms listed for trading on major U.S. exchanges. We also survey existing empirical research on the economic consequences of deregistration and delisting decisions under the old rules. Section 3 introduces our sample and compares characteristics of deregistering firms with those of foreign listed firms that have not deregistered. The event-study analysis of the stock-price reactions of the deregistering firms to the passage of SOX, to the announcement of the new Rule 12h-6, and around their respective decisions to deregister all follow in Section 4. We then offer concluding remarks. (or 500, if assets are less than $10 million) at the end of a fiscal year, the FPI must resume its reporting obligations. 4 These conditions are certified by voluntarily filing with the SEC Form 15, a one-page form that includes information such as the class of securities being deregistered, the class of securities that still may require a duty to file, the filer's address and the number of shareholders of record in the U.S.
The Past and Present Deregistration Process for
Each U.S. exchange sets its own delisting standards and these are considerably less burdensome than those that govern deregistration from SEC reporting obligations. Macey, O'Hara, and Pompilio (2004) classify delisting standards into two broad categories: profit-related and reputation-related standards. The profit standards are put in place to eliminate those firms that are unprofitable to the exchange and they stipulate minimum criteria based on market capitalization, price per share, number of publicly-held shares, number of registered shareholders, and trading volume. 5 The reputation-related standards are set to maintain the exchange's reputation as a self-regulatory organization (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2003) 4 What constitutes a FPI is governed by Exchange Act Rule 3b-4 and the relevant statutory section applies only to equity securities as noted. For the purpose of determining the number of U.S. resident shareholders, a FPI must use the method of counting provided under Rule 12g3-2(a). This method requires looking through the record ownership of brokers, dealers, banks, or other nominees on a worldwide basis and counting the number of separate accounts of customers resident in the U.S. for which the securities are held. Under this rule, issuers are required to make inquiries of all nominees, wherever located and wherever in the chain of ownership, for the purpose of assessing the number of U. This ADR termination process is again much less onerous than the process associated with deregistration from reporting obligations to the SEC.
There are several empirical studies of the determinants and economic consequences of foreign delistings from U.S. stock exchanges, fewer on those of foreign delistings from other markets and, to the best of our knowledge, only three on foreign deregistrations from U.S. markets. Liu (2004) looks at the stock-price reactions of 103 foreign firms involuntarily delisting from U.S. markets over the period 1990 -2003 , while Liu and Stowe (2005 examine the effects of 54 U.S. firms voluntarily delisting from Japan . The former study shows a 4.49% decline on average, while the latter shows no reaction whatsoever. Witmer (2006) confirms a 6% decline for a larger sample of 116 foreign delistings from U.S.
exchanges between 1990 and 2003, but he also shows that those that voluntary delist and those with smaller turnover in U.S. markets experience smaller negative reactions. Li (2007) and Smith (2007) focus their studies on the impact of the passage of SOX on the economic consequences of foreign delistings in U.S. markets. Specifically, Li uncovers a weakly significant negative pre-SOX stock-price reaction around delistings (-1.58% for 15 events with three-day event windows) while Smith finds an insignificant, but positive reaction (3.74% for 82 events); both studies find large positive post-SOX reactions (2.39% for 40 delistings for Li, 6 .92% for 66 events in Smith). Li (2007) and Marosi and Massoud (2006) specifically examine the changes in the count of deregistration events and resulting stock-price reactions before and after SOX. Li finds that the typical negative reaction around pre-SOX deregistrations (-0.62% for 60 events) becomes positive (+2.30% for 13 events) post-SOX. 7 Marosi and Massoud, however, show the reverse effect: the three-day stock-price reactions are significantly negative in the post-SOX period (-2.81% for 73 events) compared to the pre-SOX period (-2.67% for 25 events). One reason for the conflicting findings in these studies is that only a small and very select set of foreign firms were able to pursue deregistration under the previous rules.
6 Two studies examine the long-term impact of SOX in terms of deregistration decisions of U.S. issuers. Leuz, Triantis, and Wang (2008) and Marosi and Massoud (2007) find that more issuers deregister in the post-SOX period, but the significantly-negative abnormal returns at the announcements are similar in the pre-and post-SOX periods. 7 We refer to the working paper version of the paper because the published version ( Marosi and Massoud (2008) ) does not contain as much information for the comparison of the pre-Sox and post-Sox periods.
b. The New Rule 12h-6
Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 proposes market-based tests such that firms can qualify for deregistration using a benchmark of less than 5% of average worldwide trading volume taking place on U.S. markets (measured over the preceding year). The average daily trading volume (ADTV) must be no greater than 5% of the worldwide ADTV for that security (with clear definitions of which securities qualify for calculation during the preceding 12-month period in order to qualify for a Form 15F filing used to notify the SEC of the decision to terminate registration). Either the standard is met at the time of delisting from the U.S. exchange or there is a one-year ineligibility period for the ADTV calculation after an exchange delisting. There are also three additional conditions: (a) FPIs must have been a reporting company for at least one year, (b) they must not have sold securities in a registered offering for at least one year, and (c) they must maintain a listing in a foreign jurisdiction (primary trading market) for at least one year (see To date, there is only one study that has examined the market impact of Rule 12h-6 on foreign firms. Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2007) show that the average abnormal return over the three days surrounding the rule change of exchange-listed foreign firms is -0.5% and is statistically insignificantly different from zero, but the median abnormal return of -0.1%, though smaller, is significant. For over-the-counter traded Level 1 ADRs, the median abnormal return is -0.2%, but is statistically significant only at the 10% level.
The negative reactions are concentrated in firms from countries with weaker home-country disclosure requirements. They interpret their results to be supportive of the bonding theory since the rule change makes it easier for foreign firms to break their commitment to U.S. rules and regulations and hence reduces the value of that commitment. In their study, they do not examine which firms actually chose to exercise the option to deregister under the new rule and what the economic consequences were to their particular decisions.
Which Firms Deregistered Under New Rule 12h-6?
The bonding theory offers specific predictions on which foreign firms are likely to deregister from U.S. capital markets. After all, the benefit from cross-listing depends on corporate insiders gaining from having their firm access capital markets on better terms. Insiders at a firm with no growth opportunities or no foreseeable need for external capital to finance growth opportunities realize little benefit from having their firm cross-listed. Consequently, firms with poor growth opportunities in relation to their cash flows are more likely to deregister.
In this section, we first describe our sample of 59 foreign firms that deregistered from U.S. markets using Rule 12h-6 and then compare the characteristics of these firms with those of firms cross-listed on We begin by comparing the deregistering firms to a benchmark sample of foreign firms with listings on the major U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. There are between 510 and 686 benchmark firms depending on the availability of the firm attribute. Our data source for firm characteristics is Thomson
Financial's Worldscope database. Worldscope covers companies in more than 50 developed and emerging markets, representing more than 96 percent of the market value of the world's publicly traded companies. We include firms with total assets of at least $10 million (but also assess the sensitivity of our analysis to higher thresholds of $100 million and excluding financial firms as well as firms from tax havens).
The firm-level variables are defined as follows. Total assets are in are converted to U.S. dollars at fiscal year-end exchange rates and leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets. Ownership measures the fraction of shares outstanding held by corporate insiders as computed by Worldscope. 9 It includes, but is not restricted to, shares held by officers, directors and their immediate families, those held in trust, those held by other corporations, those held by pension plans, and by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. We use two proxies for growth opportunities: sales growth and the median Tobin's q ratio of the global industry group to which the firm belongs. Sales growth is measured as a two-year geometric average of annual inflation-adjusted growth in sales and is winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to reduce the impact of outliers. We adjust sales growth for inflation using the change in the consumer price index for the country, as reported by the International Monetary Fund. Following the literature, we compute Tobin's q as follows. For the numerator, we take the book value of total assets, subtract the book value of equity, and add the market value of equity. For the denominator, we use the book value of total assets.
We also use as country variables legal origin (e.g., Common Law) from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), a legal index that multiplies the anti-director rights variable from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) by the rule of law index from La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), 10 stock market capitalization divided by GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and (log of) Gross National Product (GNP) per capita. The latter two variables are from the World Bank WDI database. firms and these differences are statistically significant. The differences in Tobin's q and global industry median q are not significantly different, although the average and median Tobin's q of deregistering firms are lower. The average and median GNP per capita is higher for deregistering firms. Fewer deregistering firms are domiciled in common law countries, but there are no significant differences in overall legal index scores. Finally, stock market capitalization to GDP is often used as a measure of financial development. Deregistering firms typically come from countries that are less financially developed than the foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister.
We perform several robustness checks. We use data for 2005 and find similar results. We exclude financial firms and those domiciled in tax havens, like Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, from the deregistering and benchmark set of firms and require minimum total assets to exceed $100 million.
Inferences are unchanged. When only the "pure" deregistering firms (44 of the 59 firms that had not previously delisted from a major exchange) are included in the comparison analysis, the differences between those and the benchmark exchange-listed firms are similar.
In Table 2 we estimate logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals one for firms that deregistered using Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 in 2007 and zero otherwise, using a benchmark sample of foreign firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. The coefficient standard errors are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. To compare differences in the "cross-listing premium" for deregistering firms and the benchmark exchange-listed firms, we estimate regressions similar to those in Stulz (2004, 2008) except that we estimate the premium separately for each group of firms. The cross-listing premium is estimated from an ordinary least squares regression of Tobin's q on dummy variables for whether the firm was exchange-listed at some point and deregistered in 2007 under Rule 12h-6 or not, whether it is a non-deregistering U.S. exchange-listed firm or not, whether it is a Rule 144a private placement or not, whether it is an Level 1 OTC U.S. listing or not, whether it is listed in London on AIM, as a depositary receipt, or as an ordinary listing, trailing two-year geometric-averaged sales growth, median Tobin's q of the global industry group of the firm, and log assets. The regression includes all firms that are in the Worldscope database and have total assets of at least $10 million in a given year. It is estimated with country fixed effects and with country-level clustering of standard errors. 
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The difference in the evolution of the premium after 2002 is consistent with the difference in the evolution of sales growth, which makes it unlikely that it was caused by SOX. Further, the event study evidence that follows in Section 4 shows that it is even less likely that SOX had any impact on the differential evolution of the cross-listing premium for deregistering firms and for the benchmark exchange-listed firms during this period. 12 When we focus on the sample of non-financial firms with at least $100 million in assets, the results are similar. When we focus on the subset of the 44 "pure" deregistering firms, the results are also similar, but with two exceptions: the benchmark exchange-listed coefficients are still larger in 2005 and 2006 (0.23 and 0.24 compared to 0.07 and 0.16), but the difference is not significant. 13 We exclude benchmark firms with less than 100 weekly observations over the period of analysis (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , those with less than $10 million in total assets, and any that delisted prior to July 8, 2002. To eliminate extreme observations associated with thin trading, we require that firms' shares trade in at least 40% of the weekly observations. Finally, we screen the data for errors (see Ince and Porter (2006) for a discussion of the issues). The portfolio consists of 600 to 700 different firms over the period of analysis.
well as the size and book-to-market factors, SMB and HML, from Fama and French (1993) Table 3 The negative coefficient on SMB of -0.14 (t-statistic of 3.26) implies that the deregistering portfolio comoves more systematically with larger market capitalization stocks, which is perhaps not surprising since we saw in Table 1 that deregistering firms are larger. Finally, deregistering firms have a stronger systematic comovement with value stocks with a positive coefficient on HML of 0.17 (t-statistic of 3.62).
The worse performance of deregistering firms occurs during the pre-deregistration period (-18.7 basis points, t-statistic of 2.39) since the intercept of the regression for the deregistration subperiod is not significant. Panel b shows different results when we use market value weights for the portfolio of deregistering firms and for the benchmark portfolio of exchange-listed firms. With value-weighted portfolios, there is no underperformance of deregistering firms. One way to understand this difference in results is that smaller deregistrants underperformed more than larger deregistrants, particularly in the prederegistration period. We also estimated the regressions using non-financial firms with more than $100 million of assets and using the sample of 44 "pure" deregistering firms. We find similar results for these different samples.
SOX, Loss of Market Competitiveness, and Deregistering Foreign Firms
The and, Zingales, 2007) .
Several empirical studies evaluate the effects of SOX on U.S. firms by examining stock returns, changes in accounting and audit costs, and going-private decisions, but with mixed results (see, among others, Rezaee and Jain, 2006; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Engel, Hayes, and, Wang, 2007; Li, Pincus, and Rezo, 2007; Zhang, 2007) . Leuz (2007) argues that the greatest challenge to these studies is the absence of a natural control group of comparable, but unaffected, U.S. firms against which to judge the impact of SOX. As a result, other researchers have sought answers by focusing on the impact of SOX on various decisions and market outcomes for foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges relative to equivalent domestic peers unaffected by the legislation (Duarte, Kong, Young, and Siegel, 2007; Hostak, Karaoglu, Lys, and Yang, 2007; Marosi and Massoud, 2008; and, Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008) . Studies by Berger, Li, and Wong (2005) , Li (2007) , Litvak (2007) , and Smith (2007) examine the abnormal stock-price reactions of foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges to the announcements of the passage of key provisions of the Act and other important related events. Litvak concludes that there is a significant negative reaction to SOX events for exchange-listed foreign firms when measured relative to foreign firms not listed in the U.S. and to foreign firms listed in the U.S. via
Rule 144a and Level 1 ADRs as benchmarks; Berger, Li, and Wong look at similar SOX-related events but use a value-weighted portfolio of U.S. stocks as a benchmark and find a positive reaction for foreign exchange-listed stocks; and, both Li and Smith uncover significant negative abnormal returns for foreignlisted firms when measured relative to home-market index returns as benchmarks.
These SOX-related events offer a unique experimental design for our study to evaluate the abnormal stock-price reactions of the foreign firms that eventually deregistered. The loss of competitiveness theory relies on the view that SOX affected firms adversely. As a result of this adverse effect, the value of a U.S.
listing became negative for some firms and these firms became eager to leave the U.S. markets. Now that it became easier for firms to leave the U.S. markets, these firms are doing so. We explore the assumptions that underlie this theory. First, we investigate whether the shareholders of foreign listed firms suffered a wealth loss from SOX. Second, we test whether the shareholders of those firms that eventually deregistered suffered a wealth loss from SOX. Finally, if the value of a listing is the same for all firms, the loss of competitiveness theory would imply that the shareholders of the firms that deregistered suffered greater wealth losses from the passage of SOX than those of firms that did not deregister. We investigate this hypothesis as well.
We can also test a corollary of the loss of competitiveness theory. The SEC eventually adopted the change in rules on terminating registration after significant lobbying pressure from a number of organizations and firms that grew in the wake of SOX. To assess the effect of these SOX-related events, we construct equally-and value-weighted portfolios of all exchange-listed firms, of the 59 deregistering firms, and of a benchmark set of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister. This approach allows us to estimate the overall impact of SOX for each group of firms, while accounting for cross-correlations in firms' stock returns, a critical issue when analyzing the impact of common events, like regulatory changes, across firms (see Schwert, 1981, Schipper and Thompson, 1983; and, Binder, 1985) . To estimate the abnormal stock-price reactions for the SOX events, we specify and estimate by ordinary least squares (OLS) the following regression over the period from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2003:
where R p is the daily return for the portfolio of interest, R b is the return on a benchmark portfolio, and
Event_Dummy is a vector that contains 14 dummy variables associated with each of the key SOX dates.
We estimate this regression for the three different portfolios of interest: a portfolio comprised of all exchange-listed firms, a portfolio of 59 firms that deregistered, and a portfolio short in the latter portfolio and long in the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister. In each regression, the benchmark portfolio consists of Level 1 OTC and Rule 144a firms. These firms constitute an appropriate benchmark since they are foreign firms that are participating in the international capital markets, but are not registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act of 1934 and are not subject to the provisions of SOX. To define the event dummies, we set each dummy variable equal to one for the day of the event, the day before, and the day after, and to zero on all other days. We include one day before and after the event because the stocks in each portfolio come from different countries where the home markets of these stocks often have different opening hours than the U.S. markets. As a result, news in the U.S. on date t could be impounded in the stock price in its home country on date t-1 or on day t+1.
16 Table 4 presents the results; in Panel a, we examine each individual SOX-related event separately, and, in Panels b and c, we do so for condensed event dummies comprising multiple SOX-related events.
Models 1 (equally-weighted) and 4 (value-weighted) in Panel a show a strong contemporaneous correlation of returns on the exchange-listed foreign stocks and the benchmark Level 1 OTC/Rule 144a stocks with a beta coefficient around 1.09 and an adjusted R 2 in excess of 70%. For Model 1 only, we uncover a negative stock-price reaction of -50 basis points (t-statistic of 1.67) around the date of the first announcement by the Senate Banking Committee (June 12, 2002) and a positive, significant reaction of 16 Although we use the same event dates as Litvak (2007), we define the event dummies differently to account for differences in the time zones of the firms' home markets. For example, for the early SEC announcement on January 17, we set it to one on January 16, 17, and 18 whereas Litvak sets it to one on January 18 (Litvak, 2007, Banking Committee met and approved the bill, we find a positive significant coefficient of 61 basis points (t-statistic of 2.06). Second, around the day that Pitt suggests an exemption, we find a significant positive abnormal return of 39 basis points (t-statistic of 1.69). The latter result is consistent with the loss of competitiveness hypothesis, but the former is not.
Models 2 and 5 present the corresponding results for the deregistering firms. In both models we find a significantly positive abnormal reaction to the announcement that the Senate Banking Committee approves the bill (June 18, 2002) . In Model 2, we find a significantly positive reaction on the day of the votes in the House and the Senate ratifying the Conference Committee Report (60 basis points). There is some ambiguity as to how to classify that day, however. On the one hand, agreement on the conference report means that passage of the bill becomes more likely, which should be a negative event from the perspective of the loss of competitiveness hypothesis. On the other hand, Litvak (2007) reports that on that day Senator Michael Enzi of Wyoming argued that foreign companies should be exempted, which should be viewed as a positive event from the perspective of the loss of competitiveness hypothesis. To give the loss of competitiveness hypothesis the benefit of the doubt, we classify this day as one that is supportive of the hypothesis for deregistering firms. The significantly negative reaction to the announcement of no foreign firm exemption to the SEC's proposed Rule 302 on certification requirements for financial officers (106 basis points) and the positive reaction to Pitt's suggestion of an exemption for foreign companies (56 basis points) are also consistent with the theory. In contrast, with
Model 5, the abnormal return for the approval of the Conference Committee Report is significantly negative instead of significantly positive, which is inconsistent with the loss of competitiveness hypothesis. The announcement of no foreign exemptions to proposed Rule 302 is associated with an insignificant abnormal return, as is that for the Pitt proposal. Models 3 and 6 examine the differences in abnormal returns between the portfolio of firms that deregistered and the portfolio of firms that did not deregister. The only significant differences in Model 3 are a positive significant difference (so the portfolio of deregistering firms gains relative to the portfolio of firms that did not deregister) on the day of the conference report and a significant negative difference when the announcement of no exemptions to the proposed Rule 302 is made. With Model 6, the only significant difference is a negative one for the announcement of the Conference Committee report.
The results in Models 1 through 6 of Panel a of Table 4 show that (a) results depend on whether one uses equally-weighted or value-weighted portfolios, (b) few SOX announcement days are associated with significant negative abnormal returns, (c) some days that should be associated with negative stock-price reactions are associated with positive significant stock-price reactions and vice versa, and (d) there is no systematic evidence that the portfolio of deregistering firms reacts more poorly to SOX announcements than the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister. To understand better the role of portfolio weighting in the results, we also estimate regressions using an equally-weighted portfolio as the dependent variable and a value-weighted portfolio as the independent variable. These regressions correspond to Models 7 to 9. The only day that has a significantly negative stock-price reaction is for the filing of the Conference Report, but for that day the portfolio of deregistering firms actually performs better than the portfolio of all listed firms.
In Panels b and c, we condense the separate event dummies into one single dummy for all SOXrelated events. Panel c specifically includes only the most important eight events, as identified by Litvak (2007) in her Table 1 ; we indicate this by listing the event name in bold-face type in Panel a. We reverse the sign of the two events that are expected to have positive reactions (Events 10 and 13). Whether for the equally-or value-weighted portfolio returns, there is no significant reaction in any direction for the portfolios of all exchange-listed foreign firms. For the deregistering firms, there is a significant negative coefficient of 18 basis points (t-statistic of -1.79) for the equally-weighted portfolio but the coefficient is positive and insignificant for the value-weighted portfolio. The difference between the portfolios of deregistering firms and firms that did not deregister is never significant and no coefficient is significant for Models 7 through 9. In Panel c, we use a dummy variable for the most important SOX-related events.
In that panel, we find that for the equally-weighted portfolio of all exchange-listed firms in Model 1, the dummy variable is significantly negative. This result is broadly consistent with the results reported in Litvak (2007) . In contrast, that dummy variable is not significant when we use value-weighted returns in Models 4 and 7. The results in Models 2, 5, and 8 for the deregistering firms are similar. The difference between the portfolio of firms that deregistered and the portfolio of firms that did not deregister is never significant.
The bottom line from these regressions is that inferences about whether or not SOX had an adverse impact on foreign exchange-listed firms and on deregistering firms are extremely model sensitive. Since an equally-weighted portfolio gives more weight to small firms than a value-weighted portfolio, it seems reasonable to say that the results are consistent with the view that the wealth losses associated with SOX
were not economically significant but that it is possible that the smallest firms were affected adversely.
There is no significant evidence, however, showing that the deregistering firms had worse stock-price reactions to SOX announcements than the benchmark exchange-listed foreign firms. These conclusions are robust if we restrict our sample firms to non-financial firms with assets of more than $100 million, if
we focus on the sample of 44 "pure" deregistering firms, and to different estimation windows. Table 5 provides our estimates of the stock-price reactions to the announcements related to Rule 12h-6. We find that no date has a positive stock-price reaction. The result for exchange-listed firms is not surprising in light of the work of Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2007) . The result for deregistering firms is surprising, however, given the loss of competitiveness theory since the market would presumably have anticipated that these firms would benefit from the announcements. At the same time, however, the estimates are not supportive of the bonding theory either. With that theory, we would expect a negative announcement return for the rule change since allowing firms to renege more easily on the bonding provided by adherence to U.S. laws and regulations would decrease the value of a U.S. listing.
c. Stock-Price Reactions of Deregistering Firms to their Deregistration Announcements
We now turn to the stock-price reactions around firms' deregistration announcements. Although the firms made their announcements at different times after the new rules were adopted, they are closely clustered in calendar time and the returns of these firms are not independent. We therefore estimate the stock-price reactions of the different firms in a SUR system as recommended in the literature for this type of situation (see Schipper and Thompson, 1983) . This approach employs Zellner's seemingly-unrelated regression (SUR) in which a returns-generating time-series model (usually, a market model) is specified for each stock with dummy variables for key event dates and these equations are estimated as a system of equations. Binder (1998) recommends this approach over standard event-study methodology, in particular for events with uncertain or partially-anticipated dates, and for those naturally clustered in calendar time, like for regulatory events.
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The results are reported in Table 6 . We find that the mean and median abnormal returns are negative, but not significant. At the same time, however, 65% of the abnormal returns are negative whether we use an equally-weighted or a value-weighted benchmark portfolio. The probability of finding such a high fraction of negative abnormal returns when the sign of the abnormal return is randomly distributed is only 3%. Consequently, the binomial test provides some evidence that there is a statistically significant predominance of negative abnormal returns. There is clearly no evidence to support the view that firms gain from deregistration and there is some weak evidence to support the view that shareholders lose.
We next turn to regressions to understand the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns. These regressions are presented in Table 7 . The format of the table is exactly the same as the format of Table 2, although we add two additional variables in these regressions: U.S. trading %, the percentage of the total average daily trading volume (home market plus U.S. market) that takes place in the U.S. and a SOX cost dummy. We estimate regressions using 2005 data, 2006 data, for the sample of the 44 "pure" deregistering firms using 2006 data, and for the non-financial firms with assets of more than $100 million using 2006 data. Sales growth is always significant with a negative coefficient, as is leverage. None of the other variables are consistently significant, although U.S. trading %, which has a negative coefficient is significant in three of four regressions. We investigated whether firms attribute their decision to deregister partly to SOX and U.S. regulatory burdens. For 18 of the 59 firms, we found evidence of this, based on statements made in the press release of the deregistration announcement and set the SOX cost dummy equal to one for these firms. This dummy variable has a positive coefficient, but it is never statistically significant. When we use a value-weighted benchmark portfolio to estimate the abnormal returns, we find 19 See Section 5.2 in Binder (1998) .
similar results. When we use White's (1980) robust standard errors instead of OLS standard errors, sales growth always has a significant coefficient and the results for the other variables are similar.
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The evidence in Table 7 consistently suggests that deregistration is bad news for shareholders of firms with good growth opportunities. Firms with good growth opportunities are firms for which a U.S. listing with SEC registration is more valuable. Hence, it might not be surprising that the market would react poorly to the announcement that such firms chose to deregister.
Conclusion
Until the SEC changed the rules on March 21, 2007 to facilitate U.S. deregistration for foreign firms from U.S. markets, it was extremely difficult for them to do so. As a result, firms that wished to deregister most likely did not do so because they were unable to meet the necessary requirements. When Rule 12h-6 came into effect, deregistration became substantially easier and the change in the rules was followed by a large number of deregistrations. In this paper, we investigate the characteristics of the firms that chose to deregister immediately after the change in the rules and the economic consequences of their decisions.
Two competing theories offer predictions about the characteristics of and consequences for the deregistering firms. The first theory, which we call the bonding theory, predicts that corporate insiders value a listing when their firm has valuable growth opportunities that they can finance on better terms by committing to the laws and rules that govern U.S. markets. The listing comes at a cost to insiders since it limits their ability to extract private benefits from their controlling position. If a firm is no longer expected to require outside finance because its growth opportunities have been taken advantage of or because they have disappeared, a listing is no longer valuable for insiders. Consequently, firms that deregister should be those with poor growth opportunities that have performed poorly. Deregistration should be advantageous for insiders, but not for minority shareholders, so that it should be accompanied by a negative abnormal return. Further, this negative return should be worse for firms with higher growth 20 We also computed standard errors with country-level clustering. A difficulty with this approach is that in several countries, there is only one deregistering firm. In any case, sales growth remains significant in each of the regressions.
opportunities. The other theory, which we call the loss of competitiveness theory, predicts that firms deregister because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and, possibly, other regulatory developments, reduced the net benefits of a listing in the U.S. so that, for some firms, the value of a listing became negative. With this theory, foreign firms should have experienced wealth losses from SOX, the firms that deregistered should have experienced worse wealth losses, and the introduction of the new deregistration rules and the deregistration announcements themselves should increase shareholder wealth.
Admittedly, the power of some our tests is limited by the fact that our sample of deregistering firms includes only 59 firms. Nevertheless, we find evidence that deregistering firms have poorer growth opportunities than other foreign firms with exchange listings and that these deregistering firms performed poorly prior to their deregistration announcements. We do not find any reliable evidence that foreign listed firms suffered from SOX or that SOX had a more adverse impact on deregistering firms. Finally, deregistering firms did not benefit from (and actually, in some tests, may have been hurt by) their deregistration announcements, and the shareholders of deregistering firms with better growth opportunities were affected more adversely by deregistration. None of these results are directly supportive of the loss of competitiveness theory. Some of these results are directly supportive of the bonding theory and others do not contradict it. 30, 2007 with the characteristics of non-U.S. firms with cross-listings on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. Firms must be in the Worldscope database and must have total assets of at least $10 million. Data is for 2006. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), global industry q is the median global industry q, Tobin's q is computed as ((Total Assets -Book Equity) + Market Value of Equity) / Total Assets (all variables are in local currency)., total assets are in $ millions, leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets, and ownership is the data item "closely-held shares" from Worldscope. Common law is a dummy variable that equals one if a country's legal origin is based on common law. Legal is anti-director × rule of law, from Djankov et al. (2008) and La Porta et al. (1998) In Model 3, the dependent variable equals one for the 44 "pure" deregistering firms, described in Section 3. In Model 4, firms with total assets less than $100m, financial firms, and firms from tax havens are excluded from the sample. Firm-level data is from the Worldscope database. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), global industry q is the median global industry q, total assets are in $ thousands, leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets, and ownership is the data item "closely-held shares" from Worldscope. Legal is anti-director × rule of law, from Djankov et al. (2008) and La Porta et al. (1998) . Log of GNP per capita ($) and stock market capitalization to GDP are from the World Bank WDI Database. The t-statistics, in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. Pseudo-R 2 is a goodness-of-fit measure based on the difference between unrestricted and restricted likelihood functions. (1) and (4), from Jan 1, 2001 -Dec 31, 2004 in (2) and (5), and from Jan 1, 2005 -Dec 31, 2007 (the "Deregistration" period) in models (3) and (6). R Dereg is the weekly (Friday to Friday) U.S. dollar return on a portfolio of firms that deregistered using Rule 12h-6 in 2007 and R Bench is return on a portfolio of non-U.S. firms listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. R W_exUS is the weekly U.S. dollar return on the world market portfolio (excluding the U.S.). SMB and HML are the size and book to market factors from Fama and French (1993) . In Panel a, the portfolios are formed using equally-weighed returns and in Panel b they are formed using value-weighted returns. Firms with less than 100 weekly observations, less than $10 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. Litvak (2007) as important SOX events. In (1), (4), and (7) R p is the daily U.S. dollar return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms crosslisted on U.S. exchanges. In (2), (5), and (8) R p is the return on a portfolio of firms that subsequently deregistered using Rule 12h-6 in 2007. In (3), (6), and (9) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg -Exch"). R b is the return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations, less than $10 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. In Panel a, coefficients are estimated for each event dummy variable. In Panels b and c, a single dummy variable that equals one (negative one) on predicted negative (positive) events is defined. Event_Dummy is a vector that includes dummy variables for deregistration event dates from www.sec.gov. In (1) and (4), R p is the daily U.S. dollar return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. In (2) and (5), R p is the return on a portfolio of firms that subsequently deregistered using Rule 12h-6 in 2007. In (3) and (6), R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg -Exch"). R b is the return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. Table 6 . The sample includes 59 firms that deregistered from U.S. markets using Rule 12h-6 between March 21, 2007 and September 30, 2007 . Two firms are excluded because they do not have complete data over the sample period. Models 1-3 require that firms have total assets of at least $10 million. Model 1 uses data for 2005; Models 2-4 use data for 2006. In Model 3, the dependent variable equals one for the 44 "pure" deregistering firms, described in Section 3. In Model 4, firms with total assets less than $100m, financial firms, and firms from tax havens are excluded from the sample. Firm-level data is from the Worldscope database. Sales growth is inflation adjusted twoyear sales growth (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), global industry q is the median global industry q, total assets are in $ thousands, leverage is total debt divided by total assets, and ownership is the data item "closely-held shares" from Worldscope. U.S. Trading % is the percentage of the total average daily trading volume (home market plus U.S. market) that takes place in the U.S. SOX cost is a dummy variable that equals one for 18 firms that mentioned compliance costs associated with SOX as motivation for the deregistration decision in press releases. Legal is antidirector × rule of law, from Djankov et al. (2008) and La Porta et al. (1998) 
